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## RELIGION AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS

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At last, it seems, the path between God and the human soul has been found. The dream of the Hebrew nomad who beheld a ladder set up on the earth, the top of which reached to heaven, has received, we are assured, scientific verification. No longer may we say of spirit that we know not whence it cometh or whither it goeth, for it goes and comes by the route of the subconscious.

This "find," we are given to understand, is first of all a new discovery of ourselves. We used to regard ourselves as rational beings whose beliefs are to be justified by reflective thinking. Theology assured us that even divine revelation claims our assent only because it offers specific evidence of its source and authority. If some of us, dissenting from the rationalistic assumptions of the traditional dogma, gave the first place in the constitution of the mind to conscience or the moral nature, we thought of the moral nature as wide-awake, discriminating, critically conscious, not as a "sub" of any kind. And whether we put reason or conscience first, we assumed, as a matter of course, that the way to find God, if he is to be found at all, is to raise our own self-consciousness, rational or moral, to its highest power.

But it seems that we have mistaken the organ for the apprehension of spiritual things. Instead of going up to the top story of our psy-

chical being, and gazing toward the empyrean, we should climb down into the cellar of the mind and peer into the shadows. We have relied upon the last-developed, most highly specialized faculties, whereas we are now told that greater respect is due to uncritical processes that we share with savages and possibly with the lower animals. According to this view, the more discriminating we become in our thinking and believing, the less profound is our apprehension of the broader realities. Clear thinking at its best apprehends only the outer shell or the mechanism of things. True or final reality, which religion is interested in, lies at the base, not the apex, of consciousness. By letting ourselves down into our subselves we may enjoy a feeling-realization, or intuition, or vision that conveys a superior, but unanalytic and non-cognitive certainty.<sup>1</sup>

Politics is not the only thing that makes strange bed-fellows. For in current representations of the subconscious old antagonisms are ignored in an astonishing manner. Thus, to begin with, the highest inspirations of the Christian religion become associated with the performances of the modern "psychic."

"Isn't there jam in the kitchen, Rogers?" asks Manson in the opening scene of *The Servant in the House*, and Rogers exclaims,

" 'Evings! 'E've got eyes in 'is boots."

Of the dramatic skill with which Mr. Kennedy has here and elsewhere in the play touched a popular chord there can be, I suppose, no question; but what shall we say concerning a state of the popular mind that makes possible the acceptance, as an impressive introduction to the personality of Jesus, of what has the *prima facie* marks of a mind-reading trick? Nor is the populace out of touch at this point with the movement of theology. The telepathic hypothesis is adduced in support of the mysticism of St. Paul,<sup>2</sup> and again, when the theory of inspiration is in question, telepathy bobs up as a possible help to

<sup>1</sup> Here is a typical instance of the teaching of certain clergymen: Consciousness is represented as "but an insignificant fragment of mind," and we are taught that the subconscious plays a "dominating rôle" in "creative energy of thought, in religion, in education, in the formation of habits, in the causation and cure of many disorders, in memory, and in the functional activities of the body." On the effort to justify religion by grounding it upon a supposed non-cognitive certainty of feeling, I have made some critical remarks in the *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 367-71.

<sup>2</sup> J. M. Campbell, *Paul the Mystic* (London, 1907), p. 275.

conceiving it.<sup>3</sup> To see the full significance of this point of view, we need to reflect that the mind-reader, fortune-teller, or diviner, however modern, is the historical and psychological descendant of the shaman and the medicine man.

If this seems to be strange company for the Christian religion, what shall be said of the proposed alliance between Christianity and modern spiritism? That spiritism has recently acquired respectability in quarters where once it was despised is certain. Twenty-five years ago, what Protestant clergyman found anything but delusion and moral decay in it? But today various prominent ecclesiastics not only lean toward the notion of spirit communication, but also look to this source for support for the Christian belief in spiritual realities. One of our most popular essayists on religion, in a discussion of "Religion and Ghosts,"<sup>4</sup> after expressing the opinion that psychical research is proving the survival of bodily death, maintains that this matter is of the greatest concern for religion because "it is on the great fact of the spiritual world that the New Testament rests."<sup>5</sup> The central point at which spiritism contributes to Christian apologetic concerns, of course, the resurrection of Jesus. Brierley does not hesitate to class Jesus' *post-mortem* influence—the phrase is Brierley's—with the phenomena of spiritism,<sup>6</sup> and various theologians have reduced the appearances of the risen Jesus to "objective visions" which have the same kind of truth as that which materializing séances claim for themselves.<sup>7</sup>

A third surprise is the *rapprochement* between Catholics and

<sup>3</sup> A. W. Moore, *The Rational Basis of Orthodoxy* (Boston, 1901), pp. 194 ff. See also Sir Oliver Lodge, *The Substance of Faith* (New York), 1907, pp. 82 ff.

<sup>4</sup> J. Brierley, *Religion and Experience* (New York, 1906), chap. viii.

<sup>5</sup> The general acumen of Mr. Brierley forsakes him when he makes such painfully uncritical summaries of spiritistic evidence as the following: "The researches of a Crookes, of a Myers, of a Gurney, of a Rochat, of a Gabriel Delanne, have brought within our view a mass of facts which are as solidly based as they are wonderful." "Sir William Crookes has taken photographs of these materializations."—*Op. cit.*, p. 96. Has Mr. Brierley never read the analysis of these phenomena by the veteran psychical researcher, Frank Podmore? See his *Modern Spiritualism* (2 vols., London, 1902).

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 30 f.

<sup>7</sup> See J. H. Ropes' comment on K. Lake, "The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus" (1907) in the *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 386.

certain Protestants on the subject of evil spirits. Protestants in general have refused to follow Cotton Mather and John Wesley in their defense of the witchcraft belief as a part of supernaturalism, but Catholicism has consciously clung to the central idea of the witchcraft theory. That a chief physician to two popes<sup>8</sup> should accept some modern spiritistic phenomena as genuine converse with spirits, howbeit evil spirits, is not surprising therefore. But we may well catch our breath when we find Protestant missionaries in Korea, China, India, and Africa giving their assent to the theory of demon-possession.<sup>9</sup> A wave of such belief seems to be inundating many mission fields. Some general tendency of the kind might be looked for in missionaries untrained in psychology who witness the impressive automatisms that primitive thought always interprets as possession. But it is curious that an acute infection breaks out and spreads in so many mission lands just at a time when in the home-land spiritism attains unprecedented respectability.

Extremes meet again when the objective efficacy of prayer is explained and defended by reference to the supposed connection of mind with mind, and of the human mind with God, through the subconscious. If telepathy be true, then, of course, my prayer for another may produce effects in his mind and body. Myers' speculation concerning a possible medium for telepathic vibrations now reappears as an assertion that prayer recognizes "waves of psychic force."<sup>10</sup> Only imagination is required to go on from this to a belief that matter has so many degrees of fineness and coarseness that mind and body shade into each other; that a man's "influence" surrounds him as warm air surrounds a steam radiator; and that such a "mental atmosphere" may detach itself from a person and cling to clothing, chairs, or rooms that one has used.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> J. Lapponi, *Hypnotism and Spiritism* (New York, 1907).

<sup>9</sup> As to Korea, see an article by D. K. Lambuth, "Korean Devils and Christian Missionaries," in the *Independent*, August, 1907, pp. 287 f. As to China, the work of J. L. Nevius, *Demon-Possession* (Chicago, 1895), acquires new interest through recent events. For the Indian phenomena, see H. S. Dyer, *Revival in India* (London, 1907), especially the defense of the demon-possession belief on pp. 14 f. As to Africa, see R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa* (New York, 1904), pp. 135-37.

<sup>10</sup> J. Brierley, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>11</sup> So H. W. Dresser, *The Power of Silence* (New York, 1899), pp. 59, 84 f., 88 ff., 207 f.

The warm idealism, and even the practical insight, that sometimes accompany such crude mythology, do not lessen its crudity. What we have here is a close counterpart of the primitive theory that the soul consists of fine matter which can separate itself from the body so as to work and be worked upon at a distance therefrom. The thought-circle to which this idea belongs includes also magic, with its formulae for controlling "waves of psychic force." It is possible, as Farnell claims, that the higher forms of prayer have evolved from such magical formulae.<sup>12</sup> But, in any case, the appeal to the subconscious in proof of the efficacy of prayer is another instance of reversion toward the earliest and crudest religious philosophy.

This revival of primitive thought involves, of course, a change of base with respect to the supernatural. Science and supernaturalism, it is made to appear, have merely misunderstood each other. For the theology of the subconscious makes a special point of its harmony with "the latest results of science." No break appears between what claims to be ascertained facts of psychology and the transcendent realities that we are supposed to touch in the twilight of the subconscious. And, indeed, if we grant, first, that the soul is indefinitely extended, and second, that most of it lies in a region of darkness where self-analysis is impossible—if we grant this, what can hinder us from believing in any number of connections between this unknown soul and various possible storage batteries of cosmic energy? *Facilis descensus*. When we let go the standards of analytic observation and thinking, thenceforth our power of denying is paralyzed, and we can do little but affirm, just as primitive man did. Professor James frankly admits that the standpoint in question is a primitive mode of thought,<sup>13</sup> and he dubs it "piecemeal supernaturalism,"<sup>14</sup> so as to set it off from the universalistic supernaturalism of some idealistic theories. His less clear-sighted followers, when they attempt to rescue the supernatural in the lifeboat of the subconscious, little guess how distant is the shore on which they are landing, or what company they are getting into. Beginning, say, by explaining the strength that comes through prayer by reference to the being-who-works-in-

<sup>12</sup> L. R. Farnell, *The Evolution of Religion* (New York, 1905), lect. iv.

<sup>13</sup> W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1902), pp. 495 ff.

<sup>14</sup> P. 520.

the-dark of the subconscious, they soon find that the same scheme applies to an enlarging series of marvels. Knowledge comes unmediated by experience, or inference, or history; diseased bodies are remade directly by the spiritual power that is the ground of all things; why, then, should not the dead rise, or why should not an ovum be fertilized by the same cosmic energy? Why should not Mrs. Eddy be right in thinking that we shall yet grow spiritual enough to propagate by purely mental processes?

What is the explanation of these queer thought-alliances and thought-reversals? Do they in reality follow from any new discoveries of psychology, or rather has some obscure motive of theology seized upon a psychological concept without understanding it, and used it in a manner the reverse of scientific? The answer to this question is to be had, first of all, by a brief review of the status of the subconscious in scientific psychology.<sup>15</sup> Such a review will show how slender is the logical connection between fact and theory in the new theology of the subconscious, and it will open the question why some theologians have been so forward to adopt this theory.

It is certain that at least a large part of the subconscious is to be understood as the dimly conscious.<sup>16</sup> Attention, like vision, has a focus and a penumbra, so that one and the same object may be present now in the obscurity of the outer zone, and now at the center. Almost any kind of mental operation may go on in the outer zone, and just because such operations occur in the shadow they leave inferior

<sup>15</sup> The general reader or hearer is excusable for not always discriminating between science and pseudo-science, particularly between psychology and the confused metaphysics that merely imagines itself to be psychology. Indeed, as there is no absolute break between common knowledge, science, and metaphysics, no mere label or other device of classification can be substituted for specific analysis. In respect to views of the subconscious we cannot divide men into just sheep and goats. For some scientific men apply scientific method more rigorously to one class of facts than another; on some points there is not yet entire agreement among unquestionably competent psychologists; and in any case the only scientific *index expurgatorius* is the ineffectiveness and the oblivion that the future holds in store. Nevertheless, it is certain that not a few speakers and writers who profess to occupy a scientific point of view are the opposite of scientific—they are “goats,” not “sheep.” Usually they can be detected through their habit of representing the subconscious under the category of substance. What is function or phenomenon in psychology becomes a substance in pseudo-psychology, and a metaphor is usually the medium of the transformation.

<sup>16</sup> See a careful analysis of this conception in H. R. Marshall's article, “Psychotherapeutics and Religion,” in *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1909, pp. 295-313.

memory traces. When, therefore, their products appear in clear consciousness, they seem like strangers. An uncritical person may with perfect honesty, yet with complete untruth, assert that he has never perceived this or that object, or thought out this or that idea. In such cases one may naturally feel that another mind or a mysterious second self must have done the work.

Other subconscious phenomena are not so obviously cases of merely dim or subattentive consciousness followed by lack of memory. A subject whose attention is absorbed in reading a book may write words and sentences that he afterward does not remember to have written. This will serve as a sample of facts which have their culmination in "double personality." Three hypotheses concerning them are possible: First, the brain, by virtue of organization acquired in connection with past experiences, may of its own momentum bring forth mechanically these combinations of the signs of ideas. Hence, the intelligence to which these signs point may be that of the subject himself, though there is no present mental action corresponding to them. An essayist once worked out the fanciful idea of what would happen if sounds should be frozen up, and then, ages afterward, thawed out. Just as, in this case, conversation might go on in rational sequence without any fresh thinking back of it, so, conceivably, the brain and motor apparatus, in accordance with habits already formed, might repeat old expressions and, jogged by a fresh stimulus, even form new combinations of them.<sup>17</sup>

A second hypothesis, which has never been worked to its full capacity, is the one already suggested, namely, that words written (or spoken) by a "secondary personality" are, as they appear to be, true signs of mental processes then going on, but processes taking place so far from the center of attention, and with so little relation to the main purposes of the individual, as not to assert for themselves a place in the main chain of memory. In this case their dissociation

<sup>17</sup> See A. H. Pierce, "An Appeal from the Prevailing Doctrine of a Detached Subconsciousness," in *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology* (Boston, 1906). The liability of the layman in psychology to misunderstand ordinary psychological conceptions may be judged from the fact that so well-informed a writer as Rev. E. W. Worcester attributes to Professor Pierce the notion that "traces in the brain or other modifications of brain substance are able under stimulation to transform themselves into thoughts!" See *Religion and Medicine* (New York, 1908), p. 21, note.

from the primary consciousness is not different in kind from that of ordinary, routine impressions and acts which, because they lack important significance for us, become to us as if they were not. It is thus possible, as it were, to sunder ourselves from ourselves, and this sundering may become dramatic to almost any degree. We dramatically sunder ourselves in our night-dreaming, in our day-dreaming, and in certain play moods in which we quizzically permit ourselves to act a part that is unlike our habitual self. In hysteria and in hypnosis this sundering, though it is at bottom only dramatic, only a part taken and played out, sometimes becomes so deep and wide that the subject does not effect in memory or in purpose a reunion of the dramatically severed selves.<sup>18</sup>

The third hypothesis is that subconscious processes are genuinely psychical as distinguished from the brain momentum just referred to, and that they can go on in independence of the primary consciousness. This theory of a "detached subconsciousness" has been in debate among psychologists, but the scales strongly incline toward a denial of it.<sup>19</sup> That is, between consciousness on the one hand, and brain process on the other, there is probably no third something, but the whole of what is included under such terms as "secondary personality" is probably a phase of one or both of them. Even if there be a "detached subconsciousness," it brings us little nearer to the occultism of the popular exposition. For we have still to determine its specific functions, and there is great likelihood that these functions will turn out to be as far as those of the primary consciousness from directly revealing a second or larger world.<sup>20</sup>

How has this sober prose of psychology been turned into the romantic theology that we have been considering? The means, whatever

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Joseph Jastrow, *The Subconscious* (Boston, 1906).

<sup>19</sup> In addition to the article of Pierce's just referred to, see "A Symposium on the Subconscious" by Münsterberg, Ribot, Jastrow, Janet, and Prince, in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, April-May, and June-July, 1907; also A. H. Pierce's review of it in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. IV, pp. 523-28.

<sup>20</sup> It is significant that one who attributes as many wonderful powers to the "detached subconscious" as does Rev. E. W. Worcester, should nevertheless assert that the subconscious mind "does not originate thought, it can only elaborate and develop it along the lines imposed by reason;" that "it must follow strictly the general tendencies of waking thought;" and that the activity of the subconscious mind is "no substitute for hard work." See *Religion and Medicine*, pp. 28 f.

the motive, has been metaphorical language. An old teacher of mine characterized a certain theory as an "exegesis of misunderstood metaphors." Was there ever a more complete case of such exegesis than the metamorphosis of descriptive terms like "the subconscious," "secondary personality," and the like, into dogmatically asserted metaphysical entities?<sup>21</sup> Thus we get our supposedly real psychical "reservoirs" and "workshops," and our multiple "minds." The individual mind now becomes a mountain, the sun-clad top of which is our clear consciousness or primary self, and the lower part our secondary or subconscious self. Who can resist so apt a figure? Of course imagination must follow the mountain down still farther, and we note that its base is continuous with that of other mountains and with the all-sustaining earth. What can this signify but that the individual soul is continuous with other individual souls, and also with God, and that the subconscious is the intermediate part of ourselves where our upper consciousness joins on to all consciousness, human and divine? It is hard to say how many writers have used this metaphor with convincing power. By its help how easily we look beyond the limits of individuality, and how the past, the present, and the future blend into one. How inherently reasonable, then, are telepathy, clairvoyance, premonitions, spirit-messages, mystical openings, miraculous answers to prayer, inspirations of many kinds, demon-possession, genius, metaphysical healing of any disease whatever, and wonder-working *ad libitum*. Thus picture-thinking gathers into one pifold animals domestic and wild, clean and unclean; and the whole evades criticism by a most simple device: The theory concerns substances that *ex hypothesi* cannot possibly be brought to the light where their boundaries might be defined.

The idea of a larger world with which our mind is continuous easily suggests the doctrine of divine immanence. Nowadays everybody believes in immanence, and this belief certainly implies that somehow God is present in the operations of our own mind. Some persons have been prosaic enough to interpret the divine immanence as meaning that in our ordinary functions of seeking the truth and

<sup>21</sup> The much-used term, "subjective mind," seems to have emanated from Thomas J. Hudson, whose works have been strangely accepted by multitudes of clergymen and laymen as soundly scientific.

doing our duty we are working with God and he is working in us. But the theology of the subconscious will be more dramatic than this; it will find God in a set of functions that contrast with and sometimes overwhelm the plodding labor of thinking and of moral effort. "I believe," remarks a preacher, "that the subconscious mind is the individual manifestation of the Universal Mind—God." These contrasting functions are said, also, to convey information that contains its complete evidence in itself; it is intuition or revelation; it opens to us an order of reality that is hidden from the ordinary consciousness. Thus, in the name of the divine immanence we are invited to look for signs and wonders, and the old break between the natural and the supernatural is reinstated. The commonplace becomes more hopelessly undivine than ever. And then, what a queer divinity is introduced to us: A god who mumbles platitudes and ambiguities! A god who cannot get nearer to us than the most dim and inaccessible part of our mental structure! A god who is far way when we strive to earn our daily bread, or steer the ship of state, or determine truth with exactness, but near us in the borderland between waking and sleeping! Perhaps the divinity himself is subconscious?<sup>22</sup>

Writers, like R. J. Campbell,<sup>23</sup> who endeavor to exhibit religion as a present experience of God, have doubtless selected the best possible basis for a new theology. It is probable, too, that the concept of divine immanence will be central in theology henceforth. But what will the theory of immanence do with the highly individualized consciousness in which thoughts appear as *my* thoughts, and choices as *my* choices? It is this individualized consciousness that feels the paradoxes and mysteries of life, realizes the stress of moral issues, and does all the investigating. Here, where issues are sharply defined, and rational and moral selfhood is most highly developed, we are at the farthest remove from the subconscious control upon which Mr. Campbell so largely relies.

<sup>22</sup> Consider the implications of the following: "Just as our primary wide-awake consciousness throws open our senses to the touch of things material, so it is logically conceivable that if there be higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so might be our possession of a subconscious region which alone should yield access to them. The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which, in the dreamy subliminal, might remain ajar or open."—W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1902), p. 242.

<sup>23</sup> *The New Theology* (New York, 1907).

What has driven, or enticed, religious teachers into this blind alley? It is easy to reply that the excessive devotion to external ends that characterizes the age begets a natural reaction toward mysticism; or that the nervous tension of modern life seeks relief in the kind of mental relaxation that underlies both suggestive healings and the wonders of psychic research; or that the spread of scientific method and the emptiness of the world as it is viewed by physical science—all mill and no grist, as it were—have stimulated a feeling that the important things of life are not to be gotten at by scientific analysis, but by some direct penetration into them; or that the marvels of the sciences themselves, from electricity to radio-activity, have put men into a believing mood; or that the breakdown of dogma, with its juiceless rationalism, naturally opens the way for a revival of direct and self-verifying religious experiences. All this is true enough, but it is only a part of the truth. Two other circumstances have had an influence as profound as it is subtle.<sup>24</sup>

It happens that the Society for Psychical Research was organized just at the period (1882) when the evolution-controversy eventuated in a conviction on the part of the generality of thinking clergymen that the presence of God in the world is not to be looked for in any breaks in the evolutionary order. This conviction marked the end of external or physical supernaturalism. Logically it should have marked the end of the psychical supernatural also, for mind was now included in the order of nature. But the reconstruction that this would have required in such doctrines as inspiration, revelation, and Christian experience was too radical to be accomplished all of a sudden. During the last twenty-five years the reconstruction has gone on, in fact, with remarkable rapidity, chiefly in connection with the historical study of the Old Testament. Nevertheless, minds that were nurtured in the presuppositions of the old dualistic theology naturally assumed a receptive attitude toward the psychical supernatural.

<sup>24</sup> The fact that many physicians who make much use of suggestion in their practice think of its operation in terms of a detached subconsciousness is not as significant as it might at first sight appear. For the interest of the physician, in most cases, is in practical results rather than accurate psychology. A hypostasized subconsciousness serves him exactly as the "disease entities" of medical parlance, namely, as a means for the more or less sharp demarkation of a group of related facts. Then, too, the service of a mythical metaphysics in impressing the mind of the patient must not be overlooked.

Could not this, at least, be retained? Psychological research seemed to lend encouragement, and thus it comes to pass that the supernaturalistic doctrine of a dual experience and a dual world, after being dislodged from one position after another in the long contest of which Andrew D. White has written so dramatic a story, takes its final stand in a corner in which one more defeat means extinction. And what would a victory amount to? It would mean simply that religion has a permanent basis in the dim and irresponsible subconscious, while science and the aggressive activities in general have their seat in the clearness of the upper consciousness.<sup>25</sup>

A second circumstance of fundamental import is that this crisis in theology came on just when technical philosophy was also in the throes of reconstruction and therefore least able to afford help. For ages theology was able to borrow from philosophy a concept of cause or of substance that could serve as a corner-stone of doctrine. The Kantian criticism, having rendered the notion of causation useless for this purpose, reliance came to be placed upon the concept of substance as it appears in modern idealism of the Hegelian type. Idealism, seeking in the nature of the logical reason for a clue to reality, declares that reality, like truth, is an all-inclusive One, and that it is spiritual. With one or another modification, this has been the prevailing standpoint of the philosophy of religion for most of the last quarter-century. But it has come more and more under fire. A conviction has grown not only that a mere analysis of the form of human reason is altogether too simple a way to explain this strange and multiform world of ours, but also that the idealist fails to effect any sufficient connection between the One and the Many. The peculiar difficulty of the idealistic philosophy of religion lies in the obscurity of the relation between the finite person and the one universal being. More and more the standpoint of the finite, the empirical, asserts itself against what is regarded as the high abstractness of speculation. The philosophy of religion must somehow become an interpretation of religious experience rather than a mere corollary of any such concept as Truth, or Being. Further, the empirical spirit of the age, penetrating religion, stimulates men to demand a simple, direct, verifiable way of approach to God.

<sup>25</sup> R. J. Campbell, more logical than many, perceives that this movement harks back toward belief in miracles. See *The New Theology*, p. 254.

Under the influence of Kant, the Ritschlian theology undertook to work out such a simple, unspeculative view of religious experience. The prevailing metaphysics of religion, starting with the existential judgment, had attempted to reach a divine substance, so to speak. But Ritschlianism insisted that religion has to do, primarily at least, with values, and not with substances. To the existential judgment it opposed a self-sufficing value-judgment expressive of immediate experience. Undoubtedly this point of view has permeated much of the best preaching in this generation. As a practical attitude and a fortress for defense it has been useful to religion. It has been, too, the forerunner of the more thoroughgoing philosophy of values that is now in process of formation. Whether one follows the banner of pragmatism or not, one can hardly observe the trend of psychology and philosophy without seeing that our interpretations of the world must give a larger and larger place to the value-attitude or the value-experience.

The theology of the subconscious, however, impatient, possibly, of the critical labor necessary to a theory of values, assumes the standpoint of the mere substance-concept, and endeavors to breathe into its nostrils the breath of life. Its ambition is to establish continuity of substance between man and God as a fact of direct experience. The phenomena of the subconscious get their theoretical value because they appear to lend themselves conveniently to this design. If the design would only work, we might, indeed, congratulate ourselves that we have found a simple, empirical demonstration of God. But, (1) at points vital for the theory, the psychological analysis is unsatisfactory; (2) even if subconscious continuity of the human soul with the divine substance were thus demonstrated, our apparent gain would be offset by the atavistic ideas of God that would be forced upon us; finally, (3) after all is said and done, why should we suppose that an ethical God can be more clearly revealed to us than in our moral experiences, the most complete of which are least under the control of the subconscious?